Labor Management Relations

Paid Leave_shutterstock_371740363The state of Maryland appears poised to join seven other states and various local jurisdictions (including Montgomery County, Maryland) already requiring employers to provide paid sick and save leave. On April 5, 2017, the Maryland House of Delegates approved a bill previously passed by the Maryland Senate that would require most employers with at least 15 employees to provide up to five paid sick and safe leave days per year to their employees, and smaller employers to provide up to five unpaid sick and safe leave days. Although the bill contains an effective date of January 1, 2018, the actual effective date will depend on action by Governor Larry Hogan.

The following employees are not covered by the bill:

  • Employees who regularly work less than 12 hours a week;
  • Employees who are employed in the construction industry;
  • Employees who are covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that expressly waives the requirements of the law;
  • Certain “as-needed” employees in the health or human services industry.

Under the bill, an employer may not be required to allow an employee to:

(1) earn more than 40 hours of earned sick and safe leave in a year;
(2) use more than 64 hours of earned sick and safe leave in a year;
(3) accrue a total of more than 64 hours at any time;
(4) use earned sick and safe leave during the first 106 calendar days the employee works for the employer.

The bill also preempts local jurisdictions from enacting new sick and safe leave laws except for amending existing laws enacted before January 1, 2017, i.e. the existing law in Montgomery County.

The bill passed with enough support in both chambers to survive a promised veto by Governor Hogan, who favored an alternative that would require the benefit only for companies with at least 50 workers and make tax incentives available for smaller companies that offered the leave. However, if he still vetoes the bill, lawmakers will not have an opportunity to override the veto until next year’s legislative session beginning on January 10, 2018, which means the bill would not take effect until after January 1, 2018, and could possibly be subject to amendment in the next session.

*Marc-Joseph Gansah, a Law Clerk – Admission Pending in the firm’s New York office, contributed to the preparation of this blog post.

In a landmark decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s protections against discrimination on the basis of sex.

In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, Kimberly Hively, a lesbian part-time professor at Ivy Tech, applied for but was denied several full-time positions with the college. After her employment was later terminated, she filed a lawsuit alleging that she was denied promotion and then terminated because of her sexual orientation. The lower courts held that they were bound by Seventh Circuit precedent to rule that sexual orientation was not a protected category under Title VII. On July 28, 2016, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit held that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination. The Seventh Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc with all 11 judges.

Deviating from almost every other circuit court, the Seventh Circuit voted 8-3 that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination. In March, the Eleventh Circuit held in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, et al. that it was bound by precedent that concluded that Title VII does not extend protections on the basis of sexual orientation. Later in the month, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, et al. While that court found that the plaintiff had no viable claim for sexual orientation discrimination, it remanded the case to the Southern District of New York to address whether the plaintiff’s claims could be considered sex stereotyping discrimination.

The court acknowledged that the three-member panel in 2016 “described the line between gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin;” the majority now concludes that such a line “does not exist at all.”

Citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (sexual harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (sex stereotyping is discrimination on the basis of sex), and Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. (same sex harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex), the court held that sex discrimination has been understood to “cover far more than the simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A or a man for Job B.”

The majority addressed Hively’s two legal theories – (1) the comparative method, whether a woman and a man would be treated differently under the same facts, and (2) the associational theory, whether discrimination occurs against an individual because of the protected characteristic of one with whom the individual associates. Under each theory, the court reduced each inquiry to a simple question – if the employee in question were male instead of female, would it matter that the employee was in a relationship with a woman? Answering that if the sex of a plaintiff such as Hively in a lesbian relationship was changed, then the outcome would be different, the Court held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily is discrimination on the basis of sex.

The court acknowledged the long-standing critique of the judiciary with respect to civil rights issues – that the court was attempting to “legislate from the bench.” Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Diane P. Wood wrote that the decision to “amend” Title VII to add sexual orientation as a new protected category “lies beyond our power.” She further wrote: “We must decide instead what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex, and in particular, whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex. This is a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus well within the judiciary’s competence.” In response to the dissent’s reliance upon legislative intent, the Court noted that the definition of sex discrimination has expanded in numerous ways since the passage of Title VII, and that the Congress that enacted Title VII likely would be surprised as to the extent of expansion.

In an expectedly colorful concurrence, Judge Posner acknowledged that the Court is, in fact, re-writing Title VII because society’s definition of “sex” has changed over the past 50 years. Instead of relying solely upon stereotyping claims, as the majority writes, Judge Posner instead recognized that the judiciary has long been interpreting statutory language in the context of society’s new and changing understanding of terms. And here, Posner writes, that we should not rely upon the 88th Congress’ “failure” to divine how society’s interpretation of the term would change. Rather, he writes: “We understand the words of Title VII differently not because we’re smarter than the statute’s framers and ratifiers but because we live in a different era, a different culture.”

With a Circuit split, the question of whether sexual orientation is a protected characteristic under Title VII is ripe for review by the Supreme Court, although this case likely will not be the vehicle. Ivy Tech has released a statement that it does not intend to appeal. The decision in this case, however, may affect the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to rehear the Evans case en banc. When this issue does reach the Supreme Court, the soon-to-be-confirmed Supreme Court justice Neil Gorsuch could render an impactful vote should this reach the highest court.

A new post on the Management Memo blog will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “‘A Day Without’ Actions – How Can Employers Prepare?” by our colleagues Steven M. Swirsky and Laura C. Monaco of Epstein Becker Green.

Following is an excerpt:

[T]he same groups that organized the January 21, 2017 Women’s March on Washington – an action participated in by millions of individuals across the county – has called for a “Day Without Women” to be held on Wednesday, March 8, 2017. Organizers are encouraging women to participate by taking the day off from paid and unpaid labor, and by wearing red – which the organizers note “may be a great act of defiance for some uniformed workers.”

Employers should be prepared to address any difficult questions that might arise in connection with the upcoming “Day Without Women” strike: Do I have to give my employees time off to participate in Day Without events? Can I still enforce the company dress code – or do I need to permit employees to wear red? Can I discipline an employee who is “no call, no show” to work that day? Am I required to approve requests for the day off by employees who want to participate? As we explained in our prior blog post, guidance from the National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel suggests that an employer can rely on its “lawful and neutrally-applied work rules” to make decisions about granting requests for time off, enforcing its dress code, and disciplining employees for attendance rule violations. An employer’s response, however, to a given employee’s request for time off or for an exception to the dress code, may vary widely based upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case. …

Read the full post here.

Our colleague Steven M. Swirsky, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Management Memo blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “NLRB Acting Chair Dissents Point to Likely Changes to Board Election Rules and Employee Handbook and Email Standards.”

Following is an excerpt:

NLRB Acting Chair Philip Miscimarra has given the clearest indication to date of what steps a new Republican majority is likely to take to reverse key elements of the Labor Board’s hallmark actions of the Obama administration once President Trump nominates candidates for the Board’s two open seats and the Senate confirms. In each of these cases, Miscimarra highlighted his earlier opposition to the majority’s changes in long standing precedents and practices. …

Read the full post here.

On February 1, the New York State Department of Labor (“NYSDOL”) adopted regulations (“Regulations”) clarifying the pay transparency provisions of Section 194(4) of the New York Labor Law. The pay transparency section was added to Section 194 as part of a broader amendment to New York State’s equal pay law in January 2016. This pay transparency section provides that employers may not prohibit employees from “inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing” the wages of that employee or another employee, and explains what any company policy on the topic can and cannot say.

In the Regulations, the NYSDOL clarified that any employer-instituted restrictions on such discussions must (a) be justified without regard to content, (b) be narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest, and (c) leave open ample alternative channels for discussion of the topic. Additionally, the NYSDOL clarified that an employer may prohibit employees from talking about what other employees’ wages are without express permission from that employee, and that such permission can be withdrawn at any time. Further, such permission need not be granted in writing.

Finally, the regulations clarify that, to the extent an employer wishes to implement a policy limiting employees from discussing wage information, such a policy cannot unreasonably or effectively preclude or prevent inquiry, discussion, or disclosure of wages at the worksite and/or during work hours, either directly or in practice. Indeed, such a policy would also likely be deemed to violate the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employers from restricting non-managerial and non-supervisory employees’ collective discussions regarding pay and benefits. The policy can, however:

  • Provide for additional restrictions on the ability of certain employees (i.e., those who regularly have access to such information in connection with their jobs, such as Human Resources and Payroll employees) to share such information; and
  • Establish reasonable workplace and workday limitations on the time, place and manner for such inquiries, as long as those limitations are consistent with standards promulgated with the Commissioner of Labor and other state and federal laws.

Finally, if an employer wishes to avail itself of the ability to use as an affirmative defense against a claim that it violated Section 194 or that the employee who shared or discussed his or her wages violated the company’s policy against same, the employer must demonstrate that employees were given the policy in accordance with the terms of Section 194.

Therefore, companies with policies and/or practices restricting employees’ rights to discuss their wage information that do not reflect the restrictions described above should be reviewed and revised.

Our colleagues Adam C. Abrahms and Christina C. Rentz, attorneys at Epstein Becker Green, have a post on the Management Memo blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “NLRB Rings In the New Year by Signaling It Will Continue Its Pro-Union Rulings.”

Following is an excerpt:

In yet another decision that exhibits the current Board’s overreaching and expansive view of its jurisdiction, the Board recently ruled that nurses who supervise and assign other hospital staff are not statutory supervisors.

A Position Expressly Created to be Supervisory is Not Supervisory, According to the Board

In 2016, Lakewood Health Center (“Lakewood”) restructured its staffing system and replaced charge nurses with a newly created position, Patient Care Coordinator (“PCC”). According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lakewood Vice-President of Patient Care Danielle Abel, the hospital created this new position for one specific reason – “to ensure accountability for shift-by-shift work flow of the department….in addition to supervising the employees on their shift.” According to the job description, a PCC “provides overall supervision of staff and patient care,” is “responsible for daily nursing assignments,” and “retains overall accountability for the work flow for their shift, and remains accountable if duties are delegated to another qualified staff member.” Abel testified, without contradiction, that PCCs must assess the patient’s needs and the nurses’ skills when assigning nurses to patient care tasks and are accountable for the nurses’ performance.  The undisputed evidence further showed that PCCs were the highest ranking authority present evenings, nights and weekends and, for the majority of the time, the only person present with the authority to assign and direct nurses.  The Minnesota Nurses Association filed an election petition asserting that the PCCs should be included in the bargaining unit, thereby adding one more dues-paying classification to the potential bargaining unit. …

Read the full post here.

The new episode of Employment Law This Week offers a year-end roundup of the biggest employment, workforce, and management issues in 2016:

  • Impact of the Defend Trade Secrets Act
  • States Called to Ban Non-Compete Agreements
  • Paid Sick Leave Laws Expand
  • Transgender Employment Law
  • Uncertainty Over the DOL’s Overtime Rule and Salary Thresholds
  • NLRB Addresses Joint Employment
  • NLRB Rules on Union Organizing

Watch the episode below and read EBG’s Take 5 newsletter, “Top Five Employment, Labor & Workforce Management Issues of 2016.”

Marijuana LegalizationWhile the presidential election has attracted extreme attention, marijuana legalization initiatives were on the ballots in nine states on November 8, 2016. Four states – Arkansas, Florida, Montana, and North Dakota – approved measures providing for the medical use of marijuana, and three states – California, Massachusetts, and Nevada – approved initiatives allowing for recreational use.  The results in Maine are still close to call, but, if that measure is approved, it will be the fourth measure permitting recreational use.  Only one state (Arizona) defeated a marijuana legalization initiative.

The following chart summarizes the approved initiatives, including implications for employers:

 

State Permitted Use Employment Implications

 

Arkansas Medical Employers cannot discriminate based on “past or present status as a qualifying patient or designated caregiver,” but do not have a duty to accommodate an employee’s use “in a workplace” or “working under the influence.”

 

California Recreational The law does not impact employer’s rights to maintain a drug-free workplace or to prohibit marijuana use by employees or applicants, require the accommodation of marijuana use “in the workplace,” or prevent employers from complying with state or federal law.

 

Florida Medical No express employment provisions.

 

Maine
(results still pending)
Recreational Employers are not required to accommodate use “in the workplace,” may enforce policies restricting use by employees, but may not refuse to employ someone “solely for that person’s consuming marijuana outside of the . . . employer’s . . . property.”

 

Massachusetts Recreational Employers are not required to accommodate use “in the workplace,” and may implement workplace policies regarding use by employees.

 

Montana Medical Employers are not required to accommodate use “by a registered cardholder, and may enter into contracts prohibiting use “for a debilitating medical condition.” Employees have no cause of action for wrongful termination or discrimination.

 

Nevada Recreational Employers may enforce workplace policies restricting or prohibiting use.

 

North Dakota Medical No express employment provisions.

 

While not all of the approved initiatives contain express employment protections for marijuana users, employers must contend with the apparent tension between enforcing a workplace drug policy and the state legalization of marijuana use. Because marijuana remains a controlled substance under federal law, maintenance of a zero-tolerance drug policy is likely the most prudent course of action.  Furthermore, employers may take note that each court to consider the wrongful termination claims brought by marijuana users under state laws has sided with employers’ rights to enforce drug-free workplace policies.

Nonetheless, as more states pass marijuana-related laws, and as off-duty marijuana users are discharged for positive drug tests, these policies may come under additional scrutiny in those states that do provide express employment protections. Going forward, employers should consistently enforce their drug-free workplace policies, and be prepared to educate employees about the potential consequence of a positive test for marijuana, regardless of state law protections.  Employers, however, should continue to monitor the legal landscape, particularly in those states providing express employment protections to marijuana users, in the event that courts in those jurisdictions require the accommodation of a worker’s off-duty marijuana use and to take adverse job action only when such an employee is impaired on the job.

Employers Under the Microscope: Is Change on the Horizon?

When: Tuesday, October 18, 2016 8:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

Where: New York Hilton Midtown, 1335 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019

Epstein Becker Green’s Annual Workforce Management Briefing will focus on the latest developments in labor and employment law, including:

  • Latest Developments from the NLRB
  • Attracting and Retaining a Diverse Workforce
  • ADA Website Compliance
  • Trade Secrets and Non-Competes
  • Managing and Administering Leave Policies
  • New Overtime Rules
  • Workplace Violence and Active-Shooter Situations
  • Recordings in the Workplace
  • Instilling Corporate Ethics

This year, we welcome Marc Freedman and Jim Plunkett from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Marc and Jim will speak at the first plenary session on the latest developments in Washington, D.C., that impact employers nationwide.

We are also excited to have Dr. David Weil, Administrator of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, serve as the guest speaker at the second plenary session. David will discuss the areas on which the Wage and Hour Division is focusing, including the new overtime rules.

In addition to workshop sessions led by attorneys at Epstein Becker Green – including some contributors to this blog! – we are also looking forward to hearing from our keynote speaker, Former New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton.

View the full briefing agenda here.

Visit the briefing website for more information and to register, and contact Sylwia Faszczewska or Elizabeth Gannon with questions. Seating is limited.

Maxine Neuhauser
Maxine Neuhauser

In an unpublished decision issued July 22, 2016, the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that an overnight residential counselor for developmentally disabled adults was properly disqualified from unemployment because of “severe misconduct” after having been found sleeping on the job. In affirming the Division of Unemployment’s denial of benefits, the court noted that this was the employee’s second documented violation “of his employer’s most basic rule: stay awake.” The decision, James MacIsaac v. Board of Review and Center for Innovative Family Achievements, Inc. serves to remind health care employers of the importance of job descriptions and performance documentation, particularly with regard to patient care and safety.

Claimant MacIsaac’s  job description, which he admitted having received, included the requirement to be “alert for … [residents’] needs during the night, including therapeutic intervention and crisis management.” Nine months after his hire, MacIsaac was issued a corrective action notice and final warning for sleeping on the job. Two months later, a co-worker found McIsaac asleep on his shift again and reported it to management. He was fired three days later.

In New Jersey, severe misconduct disqualifying an employee from unemployment benefits includes “repeated violations of an employer’s rule or policy” N.J.S.A. 43:21-5 (b). The Appellate Division has interpreted this criterion “as requiring acts done intentionally, deliberately, and with malice.”

In these circumstance, and relying on the documentation, as well as testimony of McIsaac’s supervisors, the Division of Unemployment, found that McIsaac’s:

behavior by falling asleep during working hours jeopardized the safety and well-being of developmentally disabled individuals [who] were under his care. Hence, the evidence amply supports that the claimant’s conduct by failing to take steps to avoid falling asleep during his shift, was intentional, deliberate and malicious and constitutes severe misconduct.

The Appellate Division agreed.