Dallas, TexasIn a decision impacting the interactive process, the Northern District of Texas held in EEOC v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, No. 3:2015-cv-03104 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2017), that employers do not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by requiring individuals with disabilities that need reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to compete for vacant positions.

Plaintiff, a former patient care technician, requested an accommodation after an on-the-job injury precluded her from performing the required duties of lifting and transporting patients. Though she met the minimum qualifications for two vacant positions, she was not chosen for the positions and was terminated. The EEOC alleged that the Hospital maintained an unlawful policy by requiring individuals with disabilities to compete for vacant positions where the individual was qualified for the position. The Hospital argued that the EEOC was attempting to mandate additional affirmative action not required by the ADA by asserting that the employer could not choose the most qualified applicant for a vacant position.

Central to the issue in this case, the ADA lists reassignment to a vacant position as a form of reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The EEOC guidance on reasonable accommodation also states that an employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to be reassigned to a vacant position. However, the circuits have split regarding whether an employer violates the ADA by requiring individuals with disabilities to compete with other candidates for reassignment to a vacant position. Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the court reviewed the authority in the Fifth Circuit regarding affirmative action for reassignment and determined that the Fifth Circuit would likely hold, similar to the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits, that the ADA does not require preferential treatment for reassignment and merely requires employers to allow individuals with disabilities to compete equally for vacant positions.  The court declined to follow contrary precedent in the Tenth and D.C. Circuits.

Employers should review their policies regarding reassignment for employees requesting an accommodation due to a disability and, as there is currently a circuit split, review the applicable law in their jurisdiction to ensure their policies are lawful. When an employee seeks reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, employers should work with counsel to determine whether they can require that employee to compete with other applicants for that position.

In a decision with significant implications for private hospitals, on March 7, 2017, the Third Circuit held in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center that medical residents may bring private causes of action for sex discrimination under Title IX against private teaching hospitals operating residency programs, and are not limited to claims under Title VII.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §1681, et seq., prohibits sex discrimination in any “education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). A former resident alleged the director of her program repeatedly sexually harassed her and then retaliated against her for resisting his advances and complaining about them, culminating in her termination from the program. In deciding a question of first impression, the Third Circuit held that Mercy could be sued under Title IX because, under the allegations of the complaint, its medical residency program constituted an “education program or activity” provided by a private organization principally engaged in the business of providing health care, 20 U.S.C. §1687(3)(A)(ii), that received Federal financial assistance. In so holding, Court established a test to determine whether a program is educational, asking whether it is structured as an educational program, allows participants to obtain a degree or certification or qualify for an examination, has instruction, tests, or grades, accepts tuition, and is promoted as educational.  The Court had little trouble finding that the allegations demonstrated plaintiff was enrolled in a multi-year regulated program of study and training that led to qualification to take a certification examination, and that this program was run by Mercy in affiliation with Drexel University’s College of Medicine, a university program also plausibly covered by Title IX.

Notably, the Court did not reach the question of whether Mercy’s receipt of Medicare payments constituted “Federal financial assistance” under Title IX because Mercy had not raised this issue in the District Court, although it expressed some skepticism towards Mercy’s argument that such payments merely flowed from “contracts of insurance.” In this regard we note that a number of courts have found Medicare payments can constitute Federal financial assistance for the purpose of coverage under Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act.

Importantly, the Court rejected Mercy’s argument that the plaintiff’s remedy should be limited to an action under Title VII (which would have been time-barred) because she was also an employee, finding that there is concurrent liability under Title IX. In this regard it followed decisions from the First and Fourth Circuits, rejecting conflicting decisions from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005), where the Supreme Court found a high school coach who alleged a retaliatory termination could sue under Title IX. Thus, it found that causes of action exist under Title IX for claims of both retaliation and quid pro quo sexual harassment and that, where an individual is covered by both Title IX and Title VII, that plaintiff can file complaints through either means. However, the Court did not reach the question of whether Title VII’s potential applicability barred a Title IX claim for hostile environment because that claim was time-barred under Title IX’s two-year statute of limitations.

This case stands as a warning to hospitals and other health care institutions providing accredited teaching and training programs to ensure that they have in place and follow policies that not only bar sexual discrimination, harassment and retaliation, both in general and with respect to medical residency and other educational programs, but also provide an effective complaint procedure for addressing claims that these policies have been violated.  These institutions also should be aware that employees covered under both Title VII and Title IX may pursue their discrimination claims under Title IX in federal court without first exhausting their administrative remedies, as required under Title VII.

Two stories on the new episode of Employment Law This Week will be of particular interest to our readers in the health care industry:

California Health Care Workers Can Waive Breaks

California health care workers can still waive some breaks. In February 2015, a California appeals court invalidated an order from the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) that allowed health care workers to waive certain meal breaks. The court found the order, which allowed the workers to miss one of their two meal periods when working over eight hours, was in direct conflict with the California Labor Code. The state legislature then passed a new law giving the IWC authority to craft exceptions going forward for health care workers. This month, the appeals court concluded that its 2015 decision was based on a misreading of the statute and that even waivers occurring before the new law are valid.

Transgender Guidance Withdrawal Impacts the Courts

A multistate lawsuit against the Obama administration’s transgender guidance is coming to an end. The states, led by Texas, have dropped their suit in light of the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw that guidance. The Obama-era guidance allowed students to use the bathrooms of the gender they identify with. The withdrawal has also prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to return a case that it was scheduled to hear on transgender rights in public schools. The appeals court, which based its original decision on the guidance, will now consider the case solely based on the statutory requirements of Title IX.

These stories are featured in the first and third segments of the show – see below:

The Immigration Law Group at Epstein Becker Green released a Special Immigration Alert that will be of interest to our readers.

Topics include:

  1. President Trump Issues Revised Executive Order on Travel
  2. USCIS Suspends Premium Processing for H-1B Petitions Starting April 3, 2017: All H-1B Petitions, Including H-1B Cap Petitions, Are Affected!
  3. Use of New Form I-9 Is Now Mandatory
  4. IRS Announces That Delinquent Taxpayers Face Revocation/Denial of U.S. Passports
  5. DHS Issues Two New Memos on Enforcement/Border Security

Read the full alert here.

A new post on the Management Memo blog will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “‘A Day Without’ Actions – How Can Employers Prepare?” by our colleagues Steven M. Swirsky and Laura C. Monaco of Epstein Becker Green.

Following is an excerpt:

[T]he same groups that organized the January 21, 2017 Women’s March on Washington – an action participated in by millions of individuals across the county – has called for a “Day Without Women” to be held on Wednesday, March 8, 2017. Organizers are encouraging women to participate by taking the day off from paid and unpaid labor, and by wearing red – which the organizers note “may be a great act of defiance for some uniformed workers.”

Employers should be prepared to address any difficult questions that might arise in connection with the upcoming “Day Without Women” strike: Do I have to give my employees time off to participate in Day Without events? Can I still enforce the company dress code – or do I need to permit employees to wear red? Can I discipline an employee who is “no call, no show” to work that day? Am I required to approve requests for the day off by employees who want to participate? As we explained in our prior blog post, guidance from the National Labor Relations Board’s General Counsel suggests that an employer can rely on its “lawful and neutrally-applied work rules” to make decisions about granting requests for time off, enforcing its dress code, and disciplining employees for attendance rule violations. An employer’s response, however, to a given employee’s request for time off or for an exception to the dress code, may vary widely based upon the individual facts and circumstances of each case. …

Read the full post here.

How will the Trump administration handle discrimination cases involving transgender employees? The EEOC’s pursuit of a sex discrimination claim on behalf of Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman who was terminated by a Michigan funeral home for expressing her intention to dress in conformance with her gender identity, will be an early indicator.

In a brief filed with the Sixth Circuit on January 26, 2017, Stephens argues that the interests of transgender individuals will not be adequately represented under the new administration. Under the Obama administration, the EEOC sued Stephens’ former employer, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, for sex discrimination on her behalf. The funeral home owner argued permitting Stephens to dress as a woman would conflict with his Christian beliefs and pose a threat to his free exercise of religion. The Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the EEOC’s lawsuit in August 2016 on the grounds that the funeral home is exempt from Title VII under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Although the EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit in October 2016, Stephens filed a motion to intervene as plaintiff-appellant, citing her belief that the new administration would not adequately represent her interests.

Over the course of Obama’s presidency, the trend in federal government was the extension of protections for transgender individuals. Many federal agencies, including the EEOC, OFCCP, OSHA, and HHS, previously promulgated rules and guidance affording increased protections for transgender individuals. Numerous federal courts, including the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, have applied theories of sex stereotyping under Section 1983 or Title VII, resulting in protections for transgender individuals. Few courts, however, have found gender identity or transgender status is a protected class under Title VII. Indeed, the district court in G.R. & R.G. Funeral Homes rejected that position when presented by the EEOC.

Whether the EEOC will continue to aggressively pursue the expansion of Title VII to include transgender protections remains an open question. While still just a rumor, it has been reported that the Trump administration is considering an executive order that would provide individuals and organizations the ability to deny employment, as well as services and other benefits, to LGBT individuals on religious grounds. In her motion, Stephens references the removal of the White House webpage dedicated to LGBT rights, the federal government’s requests for extensions of time in other civil rights cases, and the President’s authority over EEOC appointments as reasons she believes her interests may not be adequately represented. Further, the current acting chair of the EEOC, Victoria Lipnic, was one of two commissioners who voted against the EEOC’s July 2015 decision that held that sexual orientation is included within the definition of sex for discrimination purposes under Title VII. The Trump administration also has rescinded guidance previously issued by the departments of Education and Justice under the Obama administration that took the position that the Title IX prohibitions of discrimination “on the basis of sex” require access to sex-segregated facilities based on gender identity.

On the other hand, the EEOC filed its opening brief with the Sixth Circuit just two weeks after Stephens moved to intervene, arguing that (a) discrimination based on transgender status and/or transitioning is inherently sex discrimination under Title VII; and (b) the RFRA does not provide the for-profit funeral home a defense in this case. This stance is consistent with that taken by the EEOC while Obama was in office. Further, Trump has indicated Executive Order 13672, which banned federal contractors from discriminating against LGBT employees, will stand.

Stephens’ case may have implications for the protection of transgender employees at the federal level, but employers need to keep in mind that many states explicitly prohibit discrimination against transgender workers. At least sixteen jurisdictions – including California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and the District of Columbia – now include gender identity as a protected characteristic under their discrimination laws.

Employers are advised to familiarize themselves with their state and local laws, to take a proactive role in preventing transgender, or gender identity, discrimination in the workplace, and to have a plan in place to accommodate the potential needs of transgender workers.

Our colleague Steven M. Swirsky, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Management Memo blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “NLRB Acting Chair Dissents Point to Likely Changes to Board Election Rules and Employee Handbook and Email Standards.”

Following is an excerpt:

NLRB Acting Chair Philip Miscimarra has given the clearest indication to date of what steps a new Republican majority is likely to take to reverse key elements of the Labor Board’s hallmark actions of the Obama administration once President Trump nominates candidates for the Board’s two open seats and the Senate confirms. In each of these cases, Miscimarra highlighted his earlier opposition to the majority’s changes in long standing precedents and practices. …

Read the full post here.

On February 15, 2017, Mayor Muriel Bowser signed the “Fair Credit in Employment Amendment Act of 2016” (“Act”) (D.C. Act A21-0673) previously passed by the D.C. Council. The Act amends the Human Rights Act of 1977 to add “credit information” as a trait protected from discrimination and makes it a discriminatory practice for most employers to directly or indirectly require, request, suggest, or cause an employee (prospective or current) to submit credit information, or use, accept, refer to, or inquire into an employee’s credit information. As discussed in our earlier advisory, the Act will take effect following a 30-day period of congressional review per the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, and publication in the D.C. Register, and shall apply upon inclusion of its fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. The latter may not occur until this summer

Denise DadikaNew Jersey’s Appellate Division recently held that a jury waiver provision was unenforceable as to a former employee’s statutory employment claims. In Noren v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., Docket No. A-2651-13T3, __ N.J. Super. __ (Feb. 6, 2017), plaintiff signed an employment agreement with his then-employer that provided:

HPS and RM [employee] irrevocably waive any right to trial by jury in any suit, action or proceeding under, in connection with or to enforce this Agreement.

Following his termination of employment, Noren sued Heartland alleging, inter alia, violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), New Jersey’s employment whistleblower law.  The court denied Noren’s demand for a jury trial based on the jury-waiver provision in his employment agreement, and after a lengthy bench trial, dismissed Noren’s complaint. Noren appealed, challenging the application of the jury waiver provision to his CEPA claim.

On appeal, the court focused upon the fact that CEPA and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) expressly guarantee a right to a jury trial. Given the statutorily guaranteed right, the Appellate Court determined that in order for the waiver to be effective it must “clearly explain (1) what right is being surrendered and (2) the nature the claims covered by the waiver.”  The court found that the jury waiver at issue was unenforceable because it did not make any “reference to statutory claims and did not define the scope of the claims as including all claims relating to Noren’s employment.”

The Court noted that while it is “preferable for a waiver of rights provision to explicitly . . . include statutory rights, it is possible to provide the clarity necessary for a valid waiver without such specific reference.”  In doing so, the court relied upon the Court’s earlier decision in Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002), which upheld a mandatory arbitration provision because the language at issue – which provided for a waiver of any action or proceeding relating to individual’s employment, or the termination thereof – was clear, unambiguous and sufficiently broad to encompass plaintiff’s statutory claims.

In light of the Noren decision, New Jersey employers should review their jury waiver provisions to ensure that they clearly provide that an employee is waiving a right to a jury trial as to all claims relating to the individual’s employment and termination thereof, and consider referencing the statutory rights provided under CEPA and the NJLAD.

On February 1, the New York State Department of Labor (“NYSDOL”) adopted regulations (“Regulations”) clarifying the pay transparency provisions of Section 194(4) of the New York Labor Law. The pay transparency section was added to Section 194 as part of a broader amendment to New York State’s equal pay law in January 2016. This pay transparency section provides that employers may not prohibit employees from “inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing” the wages of that employee or another employee, and explains what any company policy on the topic can and cannot say.

In the Regulations, the NYSDOL clarified that any employer-instituted restrictions on such discussions must (a) be justified without regard to content, (b) be narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest, and (c) leave open ample alternative channels for discussion of the topic. Additionally, the NYSDOL clarified that an employer may prohibit employees from talking about what other employees’ wages are without express permission from that employee, and that such permission can be withdrawn at any time. Further, such permission need not be granted in writing.

Finally, the regulations clarify that, to the extent an employer wishes to implement a policy limiting employees from discussing wage information, such a policy cannot unreasonably or effectively preclude or prevent inquiry, discussion, or disclosure of wages at the worksite and/or during work hours, either directly or in practice. Indeed, such a policy would also likely be deemed to violate the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits employers from restricting non-managerial and non-supervisory employees’ collective discussions regarding pay and benefits. The policy can, however:

  • Provide for additional restrictions on the ability of certain employees (i.e., those who regularly have access to such information in connection with their jobs, such as Human Resources and Payroll employees) to share such information; and
  • Establish reasonable workplace and workday limitations on the time, place and manner for such inquiries, as long as those limitations are consistent with standards promulgated with the Commissioner of Labor and other state and federal laws.

Finally, if an employer wishes to avail itself of the ability to use as an affirmative defense against a claim that it violated Section 194 or that the employee who shared or discussed his or her wages violated the company’s policy against same, the employer must demonstrate that employees were given the policy in accordance with the terms of Section 194.

Therefore, companies with policies and/or practices restricting employees’ rights to discuss their wage information that do not reflect the restrictions described above should be reviewed and revised.