Our colleague Joshua A. Stein, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Latest Website Accessibility Decision Further Marginalizes the Viability of Due Process and Primary Jurisdiction Defenses.”

Following is an excerpt:

In the latest of an increasing number of recent website accessibility decisions, in Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Case No.: 2:17-cv-01131-JFW-SK), the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied Hobby Lobby’s motion to dismiss a website accessibility lawsuit on due process and primary jurisdiction grounds.  In doing so, the Hobby Lobby decision further calls into question the precedential value of the Central District of California’s recent outlier holding in Robles v. Dominos Pizza LLC (Case No.: 2:16-cv-06599-SJO-FFM) which provided businesses with hope that the tide of recent decisions might turn in their favor. …

Read the full post here.

What obligations does an employer have to an employee returning from leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)?

What must the employer do if it was forced to fill that employee’s position during the employee’s absence?

How long after the employee returns must the employer wait before taking an adverse action against that employee?

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently provided guidance to employers who frequently face these questions in the context of FMLA administration. In Waag v. Sotera Defense Solutions, Inc., the employer, Sotera, filled the position of an employee, Gary Waag, while he was out on FMLA leave, and assigned Waag to a different position when he returned.  Less than six weeks later, Sotera laid off Waag in a workforce reduction.  Waag filed suit claiming FMLA interference and retaliation.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case, holding that Sotera was not required to return Waag to his original position and that Sotera reassigned him to a bona fide equivalent position, not a “sham position” meant to mask a discriminatory or retaliatory reason for his termination.  Most importantly, the court held that the “temporal proximity” of six weeks’ time between Waag’s return from medical leave and his termination was insufficient by itself for him to succeed on his FMLA interference claim.

Plaintiff Waag took a two-month medical leave to recuperate from a severe head injury. During Waag’s absence, Sotera filled his position.  Upon his return, Waag was assigned to a new position in a different division, albeit with the same salary, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment.  Six weeks after Waag returned to work, a drastic drop in work and revenue caused Sotera to begin a series of reductions in force, and Waag was included in the first round of layoffs.  Waag filed suit, alleging that Sotera violated his FMLA rights by putting him in a “sham position” that Sotera planned to eliminate shortly after his return from leave.

The Fourth Circuit rejected Waag’s claims. Addressing Waag’s claim of FMLA interference for failure to restore him to the same or an equivalent position, the court emphasized that Waag did not have an absolute right to reinstatement to his original position.  Rather, an employee “has the right to be restored either to his original position or to an equivalent position,” and an employer is not required to restore the employee to his original position if that position is no longer vacant.  Sotera fulfilled its obligations under the FMLA by reassigning Waag to a bona fide equivalent position with “substantially similar duties and responsibilities.”

Regarding Waag’s claim of FMLA interference based on his termination, the court held that although the close, six-week temporal proximity between his protected activity (medical leave) and the adverse action (termination) could demonstrate causation for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it was insufficient standing alone to satisfy Waag’s burden of showing that his reassignment and the budgetary reduction-in-force were pretext for his termination.  Finally, the court rejected Waag’s claim of FMLA retaliation for failing to prove retaliatory intent.

This decision provides important guidance for employers reintegrating employees returning from FMLA leave. It makes clear that employers are not required to restore an employee to the exact same position held before taking leave, particularly where the original position had to be filled during the employee’s leave.  Indeed, employers are not required to hold open the employee’s original position while that person remains on leave.  Employers instead may place the employee in an equivalent position with the same status, pay, benefits, and “substantially similar duties and responsibilities.”  If intervening factors arise causing the employer to terminate the employee, either while on leave or shortly after returning from leave, the temporal proximity between the leave and the termination decision alone will not substantiate an FMLA claim – at least in the Fourth Circuit.  (Employers should be aware that courts in other jurisdictions may more closely scrutinize the temporal proximity and rely upon it in assessing pretext.)  In these instances, however, it is particularly important that an employer can point to documentary evidence of the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons supporting the termination decision.  As a best practice, employers should contemporaneously document and clearly communicate their reasons for taking such adverse actions.

Finally, while the subject was not raised in this case, employers should always be cognizant of their obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), especially after an employee has exhausted FMLA leave. Depending on the employee’s reason for leave, the ADA may impose additional obligations – beyond those of the FMLA –to extend the employee’s leave, transfer or reassign the employee, or otherwise accommodate the employee.  In matters involving the interplay of the FMLA and ADA, employers are advised to consult with counsel to determine the proper course of action.

Our colleague Joshua A. Stein, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Nation’s First Website Accessibility ADA Trial Verdict Is In and It’s Not Good for Places of Public Accommodation.”

Following is an excerpt:

After years of ongoing and frequent developments on the website accessibility front, we now finally have – what is generally believed to be – the very first post-trial ADA verdict regarding website accessibility. In deciding Juan Carlos Gil vs. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (Civil Action No. 16-23020-Civ-Scola) – a matter in which Winn-Dixie first made an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the case (prompting the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to file a Statement of Interest) – U.S. District Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the Southern District of Florida issued a Verdict and Order ruling in favor of serial Plaintiff, Juan Carlos Gil, holding that Winn-Dixie violated Title III of the ADA (“Title III”) by not providing an accessible public website and, thus, not providing individuals with disabilities with “full and equal enjoyment.”

Judge Scola based his decision on the fact that Winn-Dixie’s website, “is heavily integrated with Winn-Dixie’s physical store locations” that are clearly places of public accommodation covered by Title III and, “operates as a gateway to the physical store locations” (e.g., by providing coupons and a store locator and allowing customers to refill prescriptions). …

Read the full post here.

shutterstock_633954278In a departure from the recently developing law, a federal court judge from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) may cover gender dysphoria, and other conditions related to gender identity disorder – opening the door to expanding employment protections to some transgender individuals under the ADA.

In Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., a transgender woman filed Title VII and ADA claims against her former employer claiming that she had suffered disability discrimination and retaliation based on her gender dysphoria. The plaintiff alleged that her gender dysphoria was characterized by clinically significant stress and substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, including but not limited to, interacting with others, reproducing, and social and occupational functions. The employer sought dismissal of the ADA claims on the grounds that gender identity disorders are expressly excluded from coverage under Section 12211 of the ADA. In response, the plaintiff argued that the ADA’s exclusion of gender identity disorders violated her equal protection rights under the Constitution.

What makes this case unique, and its holding potentially narrow, is its reliance on the legal “constitutional-avoidance canon” which, if possible, requires the court to interpret a statute in a way that avoids any constitutional questions raised by the plaintiff. Here, the court interpreted the ADA to allow plaintiff to proceed with her disability discrimination claim because “this interpretation allows the Court to avoid the constitutional questions raised” by the plaintiff.

In reaching its holding, the court noted that two categories of conditions are explicitly excluded from protection under the ADA: non-disabling conditions concerning sexual orientation and identity (e.g., homosexuality and bisexuality), and conditions associated with harmful or illegal conduct (e.g., pedophilia and kleptomania). The court narrowly interpreted these exceptions and found that the ADA does not exclude protection of “conditions that are actually disabling but that are not associated with harmful or illegal conduct” – such as the gender dysphoria affecting the plaintiff. This line of reasoning in many ways mimics how the ADA approaches pregnancy: while the ADA does not cover ordinary pregnancies, complications arising from the pregnancy can trigger ADA protection.

The court also noted that this interpretation is consistent with the Third Circuit’s mandate that the ADA is “a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society. . . [and] must be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes.” Thus, the judge wrote, any exceptions in the ADA “should be read narrowly in order to permit the statute to achieve a broad reach.” As such, the Court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss.

This is yet another case in a recent wave of litigation concerning protections for LGBT individuals under the federal employment statutes, including Title VII. This ADA challenge represents a different approach to gender equity litigation that will warrant close monitoring to see how it impacts the development of jurisprudence – particularly since it is possible that the court may not have ever engaged in this exercise had the plaintiff had not raised a constitutional argument. In the meantime, employers should be mindful of their duties under the ADA to accommodate disabling impairments, even if the underlying condition is arguably not covered by the ADA.

The intersection of employment and marijuana laws has just gotten cloudier, thanks to a recent decision by the Rhode Island Superior Court interpreting that state’s medical marijuana and discrimination laws. In Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corporation, the court broke with the majority of courts in other states in holding that an employer’s enforcement of its neutral drug testing policy to deny employment to an applicant because she held a medical marijuana card violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the state medical marijuana law.

Background

Plaintiff applied for an internship at Darlington, and during an initial meeting, she signed a statement acknowledging she would be required to take a drug test prior to being hired.  At that meeting, Plaintiff disclosed that she had a medical marijuana card.  Several days later, Plaintiff indicated to Darlington’s human resources representative that she was currently using medical marijuana and that as a result she would test positive on the pre-employment drug test.  Darlington informed Plaintiff that it was unable to hire her because she would fail the drug test and thus could not comply with the company’s drug-free workplace policy.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging Darlington violated the Hawkins-Slater Act (“the Act”), the state’s medical marijuana law, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”). The Hawkins-Slater Act provides that “[n]o school, employer, or landlord may refuse to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder.”  After concluding that Act provides for a private right of action, the court held that Darlington’s refusal to hire Plaintiff violated the Act’s prohibition against refusing to employ a cardholder.  Citing another provision that the Act should not be construed to require an employer to accommodate “the medical use of marijuana in any workplace,” Darlington contended that Act does not require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use, and that doing so here would create workplace safety concerns.  The court rejected this argument, concluding:

  • The use of the phrase “in any workplace” suggests that statute does require employers to accommodate medical marijuana use outside the workplace.
  • Darlington’s workplace safety argument ignored the language of the Act, which prohibits “any person to undertake any task under the influence of marijuana, when doing so would constitute negligence or professional malpractice.” In other words, employers can regulate medical marijuana use by prohibiting workers from being under the influence while on duty, rather than refusing to hire medical marijuana users at all.
  • By hiring Plaintiff, Darlington would not be required to make accommodations “as they are defined in the employment discrimination context,” such as restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, or even modifying the existing drug and alcohol policy (which prohibited the illegal use or possession of drugs on company property, but did not state that a positive drug test would result in the rescission of a job offer or termination of employment).

The court thus granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her Hawkins-Slater Act claims.

With respect to Plaintiff’s RICRA claim, the court found that Plaintiff’s status as a medical marijuana cardholder was a signal to Darlington that she could not have obtained the card without a debilitating medical condition that would have caused her to be disabled. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiff is disabled and that she had stated a claim for disability discrimination under RICRA because Darlington refused to hire her due to her status as a cardholder.  Importantly, the court held that the allegations supported a disparate treatment theory.

Finally, while noting that “Plaintiff’s drug use is legal under Rhode Island law, but illegal under federal law [i.e. the Controlled Substances Act (the CSA”)],” the Court found that the CSA did not preempt the Hawkins-Slater Act or RICRA. According to the court, the CSA’s purpose of “illegal importation, manufacture, distribution and possession and improper use of controlled substances” was quite distant from the “realm of employment and anti-discrimination law.”

Key Takeaways

While this decision likely will be appealed, it certainly adds additional confusion for employers in this unsettled area of the law – particularly those who have and enforce zero-tolerance drug policies. The decision departs from cases in other jurisdictions – such as California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington – that have held that employers may take adverse action against medical marijuana users.  The laws in those states, however, merely decriminalize marijuana and, unlike the Rhode Island law, do not provide statutory protections in favor of marijuana users.  In those states in which marijuana use may not form the basis for an adverse employment decision, or in which marijuana use must be accommodated, the Callaghan decision may signal a movement to uphold employment protections for medical marijuana users.

While this issue continues to wend its way through the courts in Rhode Island and elsewhere, employers clearly may continue to prohibit the on-duty use of or impairment by marijuana. Employers operating in states that provide employment protections to marijuana users may consider allowing legal, off-duty use, while taking adverse action against those users that come to work under the influence.

Of course, it remains unclear how employers can determine whether an employee is under the influence of marijuana at work. Unlike with alcohol, current drug tests do not indicate whether and to what extent an employee is impaired by marijuana.  Reliance on observations from employees may be problematic, as witnesses may have differing views as to the level of impairment and, in any event, observation alone does not indicate the source of impairment.  Employers choosing to follow this “impairment standard” are advised to obtain as many data points as possible before making an adverse employment decision.

All employers – and particularly federal contractors required to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act and those who employ a zero-tolerance policy – should review their drug-testing policy to ensure that it (a) sets clear expectations of employees; (b) provides justifications for the need for drug-testing; (b) expressly allows for adverse action (including termination or refusal to hire) as a consequence of a positive drug test. Additionally, employers enforcing zero-tolerance policies should be prepared for future challenges in those states prohibiting discrimination against and/or requiring accommodation of medical marijuana users.  Those states may require the adjustment or relaxation of a hiring policy to accommodate a medical marijuana user.

The Callaghan decision also serves as a reminder of the intersection of medical marijuana use and disability.  Here, the court allowed a disability discrimination claim to proceed even though Plaintiff never revealed the nature of her underlying disability because cardholder status and disability were so inextricably linked.

Finally, employers should be mindful of their drug policies’ applicability not only to current employees, but to applicants as well. In Callaghan, the court found the employer in violation of state law before the employee was even offered the internship or had taken the drug test.

Dallas, TexasIn a decision impacting the interactive process, the Northern District of Texas held in EEOC v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, No. 3:2015-cv-03104 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2017), that employers do not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by requiring individuals with disabilities that need reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to compete for vacant positions.

Plaintiff, a former patient care technician, requested an accommodation after an on-the-job injury precluded her from performing the required duties of lifting and transporting patients. Though she met the minimum qualifications for two vacant positions, she was not chosen for the positions and was terminated. The EEOC alleged that the Hospital maintained an unlawful policy by requiring individuals with disabilities to compete for vacant positions where the individual was qualified for the position. The Hospital argued that the EEOC was attempting to mandate additional affirmative action not required by the ADA by asserting that the employer could not choose the most qualified applicant for a vacant position.

Central to the issue in this case, the ADA lists reassignment to a vacant position as a form of reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The EEOC guidance on reasonable accommodation also states that an employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to be reassigned to a vacant position. However, the circuits have split regarding whether an employer violates the ADA by requiring individuals with disabilities to compete with other candidates for reassignment to a vacant position. Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the court reviewed the authority in the Fifth Circuit regarding affirmative action for reassignment and determined that the Fifth Circuit would likely hold, similar to the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits, that the ADA does not require preferential treatment for reassignment and merely requires employers to allow individuals with disabilities to compete equally for vacant positions.  The court declined to follow contrary precedent in the Tenth and D.C. Circuits.

Employers should review their policies regarding reassignment for employees requesting an accommodation due to a disability and, as there is currently a circuit split, review the applicable law in their jurisdiction to ensure their policies are lawful. When an employee seeks reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, employers should work with counsel to determine whether they can require that employee to compete with other applicants for that position.

On August 29, 2016, the EEOC issued its final Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues (Guidance) to replace its 1998 Compliance Manual section on retaliation, including tips on ADA interference. The Guidance reflects the Commission’s consideration of feedback received on the proposal from about 60 organizations and individuals following a 30-day public input period that ended February 24, 2016. The changes in the Guidance are in line with the EEOC’s efforts to broaden the conduct that would be deemed retaliatory as well as the concept of causation.

Along with the Guidance, the EEOC has issued two accompanying documents: a question-and-answer publication that summarizes the Guidance, and a short Small Business Fact Sheet that condenses the major points in the Guidance. The Guidance also provides “boxed” examples of actual and perceived retaliation that will be of great help to employers and employees.

The Guidance addresses retaliation under each of the statutes enforced by EEOC, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).

Since 1998, the last time the EEOC issued a formal resource document on retaliation, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have issued numerous significant rulings regarding employment-related retaliation. Further, the percentage of EEOC charges alleging retaliation has essentially doubled (now nearly 45% of all charges). Retaliation is now the most frequently alleged basis of discrimination in all sectors, including the federal government workforce.

The guidance also addresses the interference provision under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits coercion, threats, or other acts that interfere with the exercise of ADA rights. The EEOC considers the scope of this separate interference provision broader than the anti-retaliation provision under the ADA.

In preparing the Guidance, the Commission analyzed courts’ interpretation and application of the law to specific facts, noting that, regarding many retaliation issues, the lower courts have been uniform in their interpretations of the relevant statutes. Where the Commission agreed with those interpretations, the Guidance explains the law on such issues with concrete examples. The Commission noted that there are cases where the lower courts have not consistently applied the law, or the EEOC’s interpretation of the law differs. In those instances, the Guidance sets forth the EEOC’s position and explains its analysis.

Elements of a Claim. The Guidance does not change the three well-established elements of a retaliation claim and leaves little doubt that the EEOC takes a broad view when defining each element:

  1. An employee’s participation in a protected activity, generally a complaint of discrimination or harassment.
  2. A materially adverse action taken by the employer/manager against the employee.
  3. A causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.

The small business fact sheet provides a list of actions taken by applicants and employees that are protected from retaliation:

  • taking part in an internal or external investigation of employment discrimination, including harassment;
  • filing or being a witness in a charge, complaint, or lawsuit alleging discrimination;
  • communicating with a supervisor or manager about employment discrimination, including harassment;
  • answering questions during an employer investigation of alleged harassment;
  • refusing to follow orders that would result in discrimination;
  • resisting sexual advances, or intervening to protect others;
  • reporting an instance of harassment to a supervisor;
  • requesting accommodation of a disability or for a religious practice; or
  • asking managers or coworkers about salary information to uncover potentially discriminatory wages.

Protected Activity. In the Commission’s view, playing any role in an internal investigation (even in support of the employer) should be deemed to constitute protected participation. For example, an employee can issue a direct complaint (“participation”) or engage in “protected opposition” by communicating explicitly or implicitly opposition to perceived employment discrimination. According to the EEOC, an employee may make a broad or ambiguous complaint of unfair treatment because they may not know the specific requirements of the anti-discrimination laws and such communication would be considered protected opposition if the complaint would reasonably have been interpreted as opposition to employment discrimination.

While the Guidance states that the manner of opposition must be reasonable, the Guidance points out that the scope of the opposition clause is not limited to complaints made to the employer directly, and may include complaints made to coworkers, an attorney, others outside the company, or even publicly. According to the EEOC, employees’ complaints or opposition activities will be protected as long as their actions are based on reasonable, good faith that their assertions are accurate. Nonetheless, opposition to perceive discrimination “does not serve as a license for the employee to neglect job duties.”

Adverse Action. The Guidance seeks to expand the definition of “adverse action” to include activity that could be reasonably likely to deter protected activity even if it has no tangible effect on a person’s employment. According to the EEOC, adverse actions can be activities that are not work-related, or take place outside of work, and may even be taken against a third party who is closely linked to a complaining employee.

Causal Connection. The Guidance also expands what constitutes a causal connection between a protected activity and adverse action. Under the Commission’s interpretation of the “but-for” causation standard articulated in University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, that there can be multiple “but-for” causes, and retaliation need only be one of those but-for causes in order for the employee to prevail. Moreover, citing a Seventh Circuit decision (Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.), the Guidance notes that causal connection may be established by combining different pieces of circumstantial evidence into a “convincing mosaic” showing retaliatory intent. Citing a decision where a termination that occurred five years after an employee filed a discrimination lawsuit defeated summary judgment, the Commission noted that it may go years back into a person’s employment history to find evidence of either a protected activity or an adverse action.

Guidance for Employers. The Commission includes a section in the Guidance on “promising practices” that it suggests may help reduce the risk of retaliation violations. While adhering to these practices is not a safe harbor, employers should take note of the list provided by the EEOC:

  • Including clear anti-retaliation language in written employment policies that provide practical guidance on what retaliation is and how it is avoided, with examples of conduct that managers, supervisors, and decision makers may not realize are actionable;
  • Taking proactive steps for avoiding actual or perceived retaliation, including practical guidance on interactions by managers and supervisors with employees who have lodged discrimination allegations against them;
  • Instituting a reporting mechanism for employee concerns about retaliation, including access to a mechanism for informal resolution; and
  • Providing a clear explanation to employees that retaliation can be subject to discipline, up to and including termination;
  • Providing all parties and witnesses to an alleged act of discrimination with information about how to avoid engaging in retaliation, and how to report alleged retaliation; and
  • Ensuring that someone with special knowledge of EEO guidance reviews proposed employment actions to ensure they are based on legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons.

Our colleagues Joshua Stein, co-chair of Epstein Becker Green’s ADA and Public Accommodations Group, and Stephen Strobach, Accessibility Specialist, have a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry:  “DOJ Refreshes Its Efforts to Promulgate Title II Website Accessibility Regulations and Other Accessible Technology Updates – What Does It All Suggest for Businesses?”

Following is an excerpt:

On April 28, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, withdrew its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) titled Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities.  This original initiative, which was commenced at the 20th Anniversary of the ADA in 2010, was expected to result in a final NPRM setting forth website accessibility regulations for state and local government entities later this year. Instead, citing a need to address the evolution and enhancement of technology (both with respect to web design and assistive technology for individuals with disabilities) and to collect more information on the costs and benefits associated with making websites accessible, DOJ “refreshed” its regulatory process and, instead, on May 9, 2016, published a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) in the federal register. …

The questions posed in the SNPRM indicate that DOJ is considering many of the issues that Title III businesses have been forced to grapple with on their own in the face of the recent wave of website accessibility demand letters and lawsuits commenced on behalf of private plaintiffs and advocacy groups.  It would be a positive development for any eventual government regulations to clearly speak to these issues.  Conversely, it may be even longer before we see final regulations for Title III entities. …

While most current settlement agreements regarding website accessibility focus on desktop websites, many businesses are anticipating that the next target for plaintiffs and advocacy groups will be their mobile websites and applications.  Such concern is well founded as recent DOJ settlement agreements addressing accessible technology have included modifications to both desktop websites and mobile applications.

Read the full post here.

Our colleague Joshua A. Stein, attorney at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Recent Decisions Reinforce That Accessible Technology Claims Are Not Going Away.”

Following is an excerpt:

As businesses continue to compete to provide customers and guests with more attractive services and amenities, we have seen increased utilization of technology to provide those enhanced experiences.  However, in adopting and increasingly relying on new technologies such as websites, mobile applications, and touchscreen technology (e.g., point of sale devices, beverage dispensers, check-in kiosks) accessibility is often overlooked because of the lack of specific federal standards in most contexts. The two recent decisions discussed below – one in New York and the other in California – do just that.

Read the full post here.

Our colleague Frank C. Morris, Jr., attorney at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Financial Services Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “New Online Recruiting Accessibility Tool Could Help Forestall ADA Claims by Applicants With Disabilities.”

Following is an excerpt:

In recent years, employers have increasingly turned to web based recruiting technologies and online applications. For some potential job applicants, including individuals with disabilities, such as those who are blind or have low vision, online technologies for seeking positions can prove problematic. For example, some recruiting technologies and web-based job applications may not work for individuals with disabilities who use screen readers to access information on the web. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) recently announced the launch of “TalentWorks.”

Read the full post here.