In a major decision sure to provoke controversy and legislative attempts to overrule it, the en banc Seventh Circuit, by a vote of 8 to 4, has held in Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., (No. 17-1206, Jan 23, 2019), that Section 4(a)(2) of the federal Age Discrimination In Employment Act (“ADEA”) does not provide rejected external applicants with a cause of action.

The case was brought by Dale Kleber, a 58 year old applicant who applied for a position at CareFusion. The job description allegedly “required applicants to have ‘3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years)’” of relevant experience.

The Court focused closely on the text on §4(a)(2) which makes it unlawful for an employer:

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.

29 U.S.C. §623(a)(2).

The majority noted that by its express terms, §4(a)(2) “proscribes certain conduct by employer(s) and limits its protection to employees.” The majority finds the ADEA protections of the Section apply only to those with “status as an employee.” The majority also notes that Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 1972 expressly to cover “applicants for employment” but never passed legislation expressly to cover applicants in §4(a)(2) of the ADEA.

The decision of the Seventh Circuit applies only to federal courts in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. But as an en banc decision (a decision by all the active judges of the Court) it may be given some greater consideration by other courts. Employers facing ADEA hiring discrimination claims by non-employee applicants, may want to consider a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings relying on Kleber or to assert the defense in appropriate EEOC proceedings.

It is by no means certain, however, that other courts will reach the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit. It is also likely that EEOC will not follow this decision outside the Seventh Circuit. And as noted at the outset, a legislative effort to reverse the result of Kleber by amending §4(a)(2) expressly to cover applicants is highly likely. Such a proposal might well pass in the House of Representatives. Its fate in the Senate, however, would be more problematic. In addition, whether President Trump would sign such a bill, if it did pass, is open to conjecture.

In addition, employers should be aware that they certainly may face the same applicant age discrimination claims by outside applicants premised on state and local human rights laws. Such state and local laws generally do not have limiting language like that upon which the Seventh Circuit based its decision in Kleber. Moreover, while employers often prefer federal to state courts, Kleber may encourage age discrimination plaintiffs who are applicants simply to sue under state law in state courts.

Despite Kleber, employers should still take care not to provide outside applicants with a basis for asserting age discrimination in hiring claims under state or local laws with broader language covering such applicants or in federal courts that choose not to follow Kleber. This is especially true as there is already putative class litigation challenging employers and social media platforms and hiring sites that allegedly target or limit notices of particular job openings to those in certain age bands. Consulting with employment counsel about such candidate sourcing activities and the effects of Kleber may be prudent at this point in time.

Featured on Employment Law This Week: Second Circuit: Title VII Covers Sexual Orientation Discrimination.

“Legal doctrine evolves.” Those words from the Second Circuit spoke volumes as the court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, overturning their own long-standing precedent. The court ruled in favor of a skydiving instructor who claimed he was fired for telling a client he was gay.

The majority opinion began by looking at whether sex is a motivating factor in the alleged unlawful practice. And, in this case, looking at sexual orientation discrimination, the court concluded that sex is a factor and inextricably linked to sexual orientation, and therefore sexual orientation acts as a proxy for sex. The Second Circuit now joins the Seventh Circuit in finding that Title VII does protect against sexual orientation discrimination, and deepens a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, which went the other way last year.

Watch the segment below and read our recent post.

In Makinen v. City of New York, New York’s Court of Appeals held the New York City Human Rights Law precludes an individual from bringing a claim of disability discrimination based on a mistaken perception of untreated alcoholism.

The question arose in a case brought by police officers against the City of New York and certain individuals alleging discrimination based on the mistaken perception that the plaintiffs were alcoholics. The plaintiffs had been referred to an internal counseling service and directed to undergo treatment even though neither plaintiff had been diagnosed as suffering from alcoholism. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal court under New York State and City Human Rights Laws and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The district court held individuals regarded as untreated alcoholics could state a claim under the City Human Rights law because analogous claims were available under state and federal law.  On appeal, the Second Circuit certified the following question to the Court of Appeals: “Whether sections 8-102(16)(c) and 8-107(1)(a) of the New York City Administrative Code preclude a plaintiff from bringing a disability discrimination claim based solely on a perception of untreated alcoholism?”

The Court of Appeals answered the certified question in the affirmative, finding the City Human Rights law was “only open to one reasonable interpretation: the disability of alcoholism shall only apply to a person who (1) is recovering or has recovered, and (2) currently is free of such abuse.”

Since the Restoration Act of 2005, courts have broadly construed the City Human Rights law to provide greater protections for employees than its federal and state counterparts. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Makinen represents a rare finding that the City Human Rights law provides less protection than state and federal law. Even so, employers should remain cognizant of the provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as they already prohibit discrimination based on perceived alcoholism.

Our colleagues Patrick G. Brady and Julie Saker Schlegel, at Epstein Becker Green, have a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Beyond Joint Employment: Do Companies Aid and Abet Discrimination by Conducting Background Checks on Independent Contractors?

Following is an excerpt:

Ever since the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) issued its August 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., holding two entities may be joint employers if one exercises either direct or indirect control over the terms and conditions of the other’s employees or reserves the right to do so, the concept of joint employment has generated increased interest from plaintiffs’ attorneys, and increased concern from employers. Questions raised by the New York Court of Appeals in a recent oral argument, however, indicate that employers who engage another company’s workers on an independent contractor basis would be wise to guard against another potential form of liability, for aiding and abetting acts that violate various anti-discrimination statutes, including both the New York State (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).

Read the full post here.

On February 15, 2017, Mayor Muriel Bowser signed the “Fair Credit in Employment Amendment Act of 2016” (“Act”) (D.C. Act A21-0673) previously passed by the D.C. Council. The Act amends the Human Rights Act of 1977 to add “credit information” as a trait protected from discrimination and makes it a discriminatory practice for most employers to directly or indirectly require, request, suggest, or cause an employee (prospective or current) to submit credit information, or use, accept, refer to, or inquire into an employee’s credit information. As discussed in our earlier advisory, the Act will take effect following a 30-day period of congressional review per the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, and publication in the D.C. Register, and shall apply upon inclusion of its fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan. The latter may not occur until this summer

Our colleagues Peter M. Panken, Nancy L. Gunzenhauser, and Marc-Joseph Gansah have a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Employers Should Care About This: New York City’s Amendment on Caregiver Discrimination.”

Following is an excerpt:

The New York City’s Human Rights law (“NYCHRL”) prohibits employment discrimination against specified protected classes of employees and applicants including:

race, color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, partnership status, any lawful source of income, status as a victim of domestic violence or status as a victim of sex offenses or stalking, whether children are, may be or would be residing with a person or conviction or arrest record.

If this list wasn’t long enough, on May 4, 2016, NYCHRL will add “caregivers” to the protected classes including, anyone who provides ongoing medical  or “daily living” care for a minor, any disabled relative or disabled non-relative who lives in the caregiver’s household. …

Read the full post here.