Our colleague Sharon L. Lippett, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Financial Services Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Potential Impact of Trump Tax Reform Plan on Retirement Plans: What’s Old Could Be New Again.”

Following is an excerpt:

While Congress’ attention has most recently been focused on the American Health Care Act, that bill will most likely not be the only proposed legislation that Congress will consider in 2017. It appears that a tax reform plan (the “2017 Tax Proposal”), which could also have a wide-reaching impact, is also on the agenda.

If the 2017 Proposal includes provisions relating to defined contribution retirement plans sponsored by private employers, such as 401(k) plans, the impact will be felt by employers and investment managers, as well as by plan participants. While the Trump Administration has stated that the current version of its 2017 Tax Proposal does not reduce pre-tax contributions to 401(k) plans, speculation continues that a later draft may include curtailment of these contributions or other changes with a similar impact. …

Read the full post here.

An employee on an extended medical leave to recuperate from shoulder surgery posts pictures of his active Caribbean vacation. His employer is justified in terminating him, right?  Maybe not.

On April 19, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a trial court ruling and held that a former employee had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was terminated in retaliation for using FMLA despite the former employee posting pictures from various vacations on Facebook during his time off of work to recuperate from surgery. This case, Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6766 (11th Circ. 2017), serves as a cautionary tale of why employers need to be careful and consistent while following proper steps when terminating employees—even in situations where the evidence of employee wrongdoing might appear obvious.

The plaintiff, Rodney Jones, was formerly employed as the activity director for the defendant, Accentia Health. His job included desk work as well as regular physical activity.  During his employment, Accentia Health approved Jones’s request for FMLA leave for shoulder surgery.  When Jones was unable to resume his full-time job duties at the end of the 12-week FMLA period, Jones requested a modified duty assignment, which was rejected by Accentia Health. Jones then requested additional time off from work, and Accentia Health granted another 30 days of “non-FMLA medical leave” in order to complete his physical therapy.

During the additional 30 days of leave, Jones twice visited the Busch Gardens theme park and went on a trip to St. Martin. Jones took pictures while on the vacations—including pictures of himself on the beach, posing by a boat wreck, and in the ocean—and then posted those pictures on Facebook.  An anonymous co-worker provided the pictures to management.  When Jones returned to work at the end of the additional time off, Jones was suspended by his supervisor and was later terminated. Accentia claimed that Jones was fired because he “(1) posted photos from his outings in violation of the company’s social-media policies, and (2) displayed poor judgment as a supervisor in posting these photos, even if this activity did not violate the company’s social-media policies.”

The appellate court found that Jones presented sufficient evidence that a fact-finder could conclude that Accentia Health’s stated reasons for the termination were pretexual. In arriving at this decision, the court focused on inconsistencies and contradictions in the reasons presented to Jones.  These inconsistencies included a formal termination letter that didn’t mention the Facebook photos, and failing to let Jones know at any time that he violated the company’s social media policy.

Employers need to be consistent when taking adverse action against an employee when FMLA is involved. This includes making sure that both written and oral communications to the affected employee are consistent and clear. Employers should take the time necessary to gather the proper facts and have better communication with the potentially affected employee before deciding upon a course of action and before letting the employee know what action might be taken. This will help ensure that any eventual adverse action is communicated clearly and consistently to the affected employee and will help limit the potential for allegations of a pretexual termination.

Our colleague Steven M. Swirsky, a Member of the Firm at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Management Memo blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “OSHA Withdraws ‘Fairfax Memo’ – Union Representatives May No Longer Participate in Work Place Safety Walkarounds at Non-Union Facilities.”

Following is an excerpt:

On April 25, 2017, Dorothy Dougherty, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and Thomas Galassi, Director of OSHA’s Directorate of Enforcement Programs, issued a Memorandum to the agency’s Regional Administrators notifying them of the withdrawal of its previous guidance, commonly referred to as the Fairfax Memorandum, permitting “workers at a worksite without a collective bargaining agreement” to designate “a person affiliated with a union or community organization to act on their behalf as a walkaround representative” during an OSHA workplace investigation. …

Read the full post here.

On April 20, 2017, in Marshall v. The Rawlings Company LLC, No. 16-5614, slip op., (6th Cir. April 20, 2017) the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers federal courts in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee, for the first time adopted the cat’s paw theory of liability in the context of a retaliation claim brought under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.  The term “cat’s paw” was coined by Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit and introduced in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) as a standard by which liability may be imputed to an employer for the discriminatory animus of a biased low-level supervisor.

In Marshall, the company demoted and ultimately terminated the plaintiff-employee after she used FMLA leave to address acute mental health problems.  The employee sued the employer for FMLA retaliation and other employment discrimination claims, alleging two lower-level supervisors exhibited bias against her because she had taken approved medical leave.  The two supervisors allegedly influenced the decision to demote the employee after she returned from leave and the ultimate decision to terminate her employment.  The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and dismissed all claims.

On appeal, a split panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed.  After holding the cat’s paw theory applicable to the employee’s FMLA retaliation claims, the majority determined:

  1. the cat’s paw theory of liability applies even in cases involving multiple layers of supervision between the employee and the ultimate decision-maker;
  2. an employee pursuing a claim of FMLA retaliation under a cat’s paw theory must satisfy the McDonnel Douglas framework and prove that the decision-maker was the cat’s paw of the biased low-level supervisor; and
  3. the honest-belief rule is not applicable in cat’s paw cases because the honesty of the decision-maker’s belief is not relevant to the issue of whether a biased low-level supervisor intentionally manipulated the decision-maker.  Nonetheless, an employer may still protect itself from liability under the cat’s paw theory by showing that the decision-maker conducted an independent investigation and determined that the adverse employment action was justified.

The decision in Marshall emphasizes the importance for employers of conducting reasonable, independent investigations to confirm disciplinary action is justified by objective evidence and clearly documented, particularly where a protected category or activity is implicated.  The ultimate decision-makers should not rely solely upon the recommendation of a subordinate supervisor when making employment related decisions, but rather should probe the subordinate supervisor’s rationale and reach an independent determination of the basis for the adverse action.

Since 2000, the number of wage and hour cases filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) has increased by more than 450 percent, with the vast majority of those cases being filed as putative collective actions.  Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), employees may pursue FLSA claims on behalf of “themselves and other employees similarly situated,” provided that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”  Despite the prevalence of FLSA collective actions, the legal implications and consequences of being a “party plaintiff” in such an action continue to be addressed.  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently examined this issue, in an opinion that may prove useful to defendants seeking to obtain discovery from all opt-in plaintiffs in a putative collective action.

In Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. et al., the named plaintiff filed a putative collective action alleging defendants violated the FLSA by failing to properly pay employees for work performed during meal breaks.  The district court dismissed the collective action allegations based on a related case that had previously been decided, and dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to re-filing individual actions.  After the named plaintiff subsequently settled his individual claim, three opt-in plaintiffs sought to appeal the district court’s decision.

The Third Circuit held the opt-in plaintiffs lacked the right to appeal, because they were no longer “parties” after the collective action claims were dismissed. The opt-in plaintiffs retained the right to pursue their own individual claims, but they had no right to pursue an appeal from the named plaintiff’s individual final judgment.  The court held that, “[b]y consenting to join Halle’s collective action, these opt-in plaintiffs ceded to Halle the ability to act on their behalf in all matters, including the ability to pursue this appeal.”

In reaching this decision, the Third Circuit engaged in an extensive analysis of the “fundamental question arising from the procedural history of this case: just what is a ‘collective action’ under the FLSA?” Unlike a class action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, where all putative class members are bound by the court’s ruling unless they affirmatively “opt out” of the case, “the existence of a collective action depends upon the affirmative participation of opt-in plaintiffs.”  As the Third Circuit noted, “[t]his difference means that every plaintiff who opts in to a collective action has party status, whereas unnamed class members in Rule 23 class actions do not,” prompting “the as-yet unanswered question of what ‘party status’ means in a collective action.”

The court’s analysis of this issue, while tangential to Halle’s holding, highlights the tension inherent in the language of FLSA § 216(b), which, according to the Third Circuit, “raises more questions than it provides answers.  While the first sentence [of § 216(b)] sounds in representational terms (to proceed ‘in behalf of’ others ‘similarly situated’), the second sentence refers to those who file consents as ‘party plaintiffs,’ seeming to imply that all who affirmatively choose to become participants have an equal, individual stake in the proceeding.”  This tension is particularly significant with regard to defendants’ discovery rights in a collective action.

Under Rule 33 and Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of any court-imposed limits, a party may serve interrogatories and document requests “on any other party.”  Based on this language, and FLSA § 216(b)’s designation of individuals who opt in to a collective action as “party plaintiffs,” arguably a defendant in a collective action should be entitled to serve discovery requests on each individual who opts in to the litigation, unless the court orders otherwise.  Despite this fact, the Third Circuit noted that, “[f]requently,” discovery in collective actions “focuses on the named plaintiffs and a subset of the collective group,” a limitation that may hinder defendants’ ability to present individualized defenses that may not be applicable to all opt-in plaintiffs.

While the Third Circuit did not fully resolve the question of what it means to be a “party plaintiff,” two aspects of the Halle decision may prove helpful to defendants seeking to assert their right to obtain discovery from all opt-in plaintiffs in a collective action.  First, as noted above, the Third Circuit emphasized that each opt-in plaintiff “has party status.”  This language, when read in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the scope of discovery, should support defendants’ right to seek discovery from “any other party,” including all opt-in plaintiffs.

Second, in holding that the opt-in plaintiffs had no right to appeal a final judgment involving the named plaintiff, the court emphasized the importance of “the language of their opt-in consent forms, which handed over all litigation authority to named plaintiff.” The Third Circuit noted that courts often rely on the language of the opt-in consent form “to determine which rights opt-in plaintiffs delegated to the named plaintiffs.”  Based on this guidance, defendants may wish to propose including language in the opt-in consent form stating that individuals who join the collective action may be required to provide documents and information, sit for depositions, and/or testify at trial.  Such language may help demonstrate that the opt-in plaintiffs were meant to be treated as active parties to the litigation, with the same rights and obligations as named plaintiffs.

While a court may ultimately exercise its discretion to impose limits on the scope of discovery, particularly in collective actions with a large putative class, the Third Circuit’s analysis in Halle may prove useful to defendants seeking support for their argument that they should be entitled to obtain discovery from each opt-in plaintiff.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Access Board announced that the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) will adopt the new Accessibility Standards for Medical Diagnostic Equipment.

As mentioned in our January 31, 2017, blog post, “The U.S. Access-Board Releases Long-Awaited Final Accessible Medical Diagnostic Equipment Standards,” the Access Board released its new Accessibility Standards for Medical Diagnostic Equipment (the “MDE Standards”) at the beginning of the year, with an effective date of February 8, 2017.

Despite the February “effective date,” the MDE Standards do not impose any mandatory requirements on health care providers or medical device manufacturers until adopted by a federal enforcing authority.  According to the Access Board, the VA—pursuant to an agreement governing its acquisitions—will require new equipment it purchases to meet the MDE Standards.  It is important to note, however, that the MDE Standards still do not currently impose any mandatory scoping standards on health care providers or medical device manufacturers because the Access Board does not have authority to promulgate rules with the force and effect of law.

We will continue to provide updates as enforcing authorities adopt the MDE Standards either in whole or in part or otherwise modify them.

NuScience Corporation is a California corporation that researches, develops and distributes health and beauty products, including nutritional supplements. In 2009, NuScience obtained by default a permanent injunction in a California federal court against Robert and Michael Henkel, the nephew of a woman from whom NuScience purchased the formula for a nutritional supplement, prohibiting them from selling or marketing NuScience’s trade secrets.  Before the federal court injunction was entered, NuScience terminated the employment of David McKinney, NuScience Vice President of sales and marketing.  McKinney signed a separation agreement wherein he agreed to maintain the confidentiality of certain NuScience-related matters.  What followed might be good book material.

In June 2010, NuScience received an email from a third-party which included an email string between Robert Henkel and McKinney that caused NuScience to conclude Robert Henkel was violating the federal court injunction. Based on the emails, NuScience sued McKinney and Robert Henkel in California Superior Court for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims.  (“NuScience I”)  Robert Henkel again did not appear and the court entered a default against him in March 2011.

McKinney appeared in the state court action and was represented by Stephen E. Abraham.  McKinney filed a motion to compel further discovery responses from NuScience and a motion for sanctions against NuScience which NuScience initially opposed.  But before the motion was heard, NuScience filed a request for dismissal without prejudice. McKinney responded to the NuScience voluntary dismissal with a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, California Civil Code Section 3426 et seq. (“UTSA”).  The trial court granted the motion for attorney’s fees, concluded the record showed subjective bad faith on NuScience’s part, and awarded McKinney the $32,842.81 he requested.

NuScience moved for reconsideration contending that after it took Henkel’s default, Henkel called NuScience’s attorney and said NuScience “better back off and leave [them] alone” and that Henkels thereafter began posting threats to publish NuScience’s trade secret formula on the Internet. NuScience’s attorney reported the threat to the FBI, which informed him that it had assigned an agent to investigate and the pending investigation should remain confidential.  NuScience asserted that Henkel then told NuScience’s attorney that he “would release NuScience’s formula to the world unless [NuScience] dismissed this lawsuit” and “cease all enforcement of the federal judgment against the Henkels.”  NuScience asserted that only later did the FBI “reluctantly acquiesce[ ]” and allowed NuScience to discuss the investigation.

The court denied the motion for reconsideration.

NuScience appealed the attorney’s fees award and the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the lower court. The Appellate Court found that the email exchange between McKinney and Henkel on which NuScience I was premised was evidence that they were engaged in internal experimentation with NuScience’s trade secret formula and further stated McKinney had been using the samples. The court found this was sufficient evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation under the UTSA.  The court further found that the email exchange was evidence that McKinney intended to use the NuScience customer list to market to buyers in Asia and that since McKinney was unlikely to have derived information about customers interested in the formula other than through his employment with NuScience, a trier of fact could conclude McKinney intended to use the information he derived from NuScience’s customer list to compete.

The day after the trial court awarded fees under the UTSA in NuScience I, McKinney filed a malicious prosecution action against NuScience and was represented again by Stephen Abraham (“NuScience II”). NuScience filed a motion to strike under California’s Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Policy) statute.  The trial court granted the motion, and rejected McKinney’s claim that the dismissal prior to the hearing on the discovery motion was a favorable determination on the merits, noting “undisputed evidence… that the case was dismissed in response to extortionist threats.”  The court awarded NuScience attorney’s fees of $129,938.75.  The order was affirmed on appeal.

NuScience then filed an action against McKinney, Abraham and his law firm, and two other individuals in March 2014 alleging malicious prosecution and intentional interference with contractual relations against Abraham. Abraham responded with special motions to strike the causes of action.

Abraham attacked the intentional interference cause of action under the California Anti-SLAPP statute on the grounds that the conduct Abraham was alleged to have engaged in – the filing of declarations in federal and state court lawsuits that were signed by McKinney – is protected conduct. The trial court, and subsequently the Court of Appeal, concluded there could be no breach of contract absent a disclosure or public disparagement and the disclosure/disparagement NuScience alleged was Abraham’s public filing of McKinney’s declarations. As such, it was protected activity.

The trial court also granted Abraham’s SLAPP back action in the malicious prosecution claim. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that NuScience had not demonstrated that the underlying malicious prosecution claim was initiated with malice because, in part, the malicious prosecution was alleged against a former adversary’s attorney, and not the former adversary.  The court held that malice harbored by an adversary may not be attributed to its attorney.  NuScience tried to identify additional evidence of Abraham’s own malice on appeal asserting, in part, that Abraham “told NuScience that he intends to destroy NuScience,” but the court pointed out that the actual evidence stated “NuScience will be out of business in six months” and “NuScience will be done in six months,” which the court stated suggested, at most, that Abraham believed that litigation would be successful and that NuScience’s demise was imminent, “not that he intended to cause its demise.”  The Court of Appeal affirmed the order dismissing the claims against Abraham and affirmed the award of Abraham’s attorney’s fees of $99,595.00.

While the initial trade secret dispute between the parties here was relatively straightforward, this case is worth highlighting because of the extensive litigation that followed. Despite the company’s legitimate interest in protecting its threatened trade secrets, there were certainly unintended consequences as a result of the company’s vigorous advocacy to protect its interests.  NuScience became embroiled in litigation spanning the course of the next eight years, itself even becoming the defendant to a lawsuit.  This serves as a cautionary tale and a reminder of the inherent risk to engaging in litigation.

The case is NuScience Corp. v. Abraham, B264334 (Ca. Ct. of App. 2/1/17).

Our colleagues Patrick G. Brady and Julie Saker Schlegel, at Epstein Becker Green, have a post on the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the health care industry: “Beyond Joint Employment: Do Companies Aid and Abet Discrimination by Conducting Background Checks on Independent Contractors?

Following is an excerpt:

Ever since the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) issued its August 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., holding two entities may be joint employers if one exercises either direct or indirect control over the terms and conditions of the other’s employees or reserves the right to do so, the concept of joint employment has generated increased interest from plaintiffs’ attorneys, and increased concern from employers. Questions raised by the New York Court of Appeals in a recent oral argument, however, indicate that employers who engage another company’s workers on an independent contractor basis would be wise to guard against another potential form of liability, for aiding and abetting acts that violate various anti-discrimination statutes, including both the New York State (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).

Read the full post here.

Paid Leave_shutterstock_371740363The state of Maryland appears poised to join seven other states and various local jurisdictions (including Montgomery County, Maryland) already requiring employers to provide paid sick and save leave. On April 5, 2017, the Maryland House of Delegates approved a bill previously passed by the Maryland Senate that would require most employers with at least 15 employees to provide up to five paid sick and safe leave days per year to their employees, and smaller employers to provide up to five unpaid sick and safe leave days. Although the bill contains an effective date of January 1, 2018, the actual effective date will depend on action by Governor Larry Hogan.

The following employees are not covered by the bill:

  • Employees who regularly work less than 12 hours a week;
  • Employees who are employed in the construction industry;
  • Employees who are covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that expressly waives the requirements of the law;
  • Certain “as-needed” employees in the health or human services industry.

Under the bill, an employer may not be required to allow an employee to:

(1) earn more than 40 hours of earned sick and safe leave in a year;
(2) use more than 64 hours of earned sick and safe leave in a year;
(3) accrue a total of more than 64 hours at any time;
(4) use earned sick and safe leave during the first 106 calendar days the employee works for the employer.

The bill also preempts local jurisdictions from enacting new sick and safe leave laws except for amending existing laws enacted before January 1, 2017, i.e. the existing law in Montgomery County.

The bill passed with enough support in both chambers to survive a promised veto by Governor Hogan, who favored an alternative that would require the benefit only for companies with at least 50 workers and make tax incentives available for smaller companies that offered the leave. However, if he still vetoes the bill, lawmakers will not have an opportunity to override the veto until next year’s legislative session beginning on January 10, 2018, which means the bill would not take effect until after January 1, 2018, and could possibly be subject to amendment in the next session.

*Marc-Joseph Gansah, a Law Clerk – Admission Pending in the firm’s New York office, contributed to the preparation of this blog post.

In a landmark decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s protections against discrimination on the basis of sex.

In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, Kimberly Hively, a lesbian part-time professor at Ivy Tech, applied for but was denied several full-time positions with the college. After her employment was later terminated, she filed a lawsuit alleging that she was denied promotion and then terminated because of her sexual orientation. The lower courts held that they were bound by Seventh Circuit precedent to rule that sexual orientation was not a protected category under Title VII. On July 28, 2016, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit held that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination. The Seventh Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc with all 11 judges.

Deviating from almost every other circuit court, the Seventh Circuit voted 8-3 that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination. In March, the Eleventh Circuit held in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, et al. that it was bound by precedent that concluded that Title VII does not extend protections on the basis of sexual orientation. Later in the month, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, et al. While that court found that the plaintiff had no viable claim for sexual orientation discrimination, it remanded the case to the Southern District of New York to address whether the plaintiff’s claims could be considered sex stereotyping discrimination.

The court acknowledged that the three-member panel in 2016 “described the line between gender nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin;” the majority now concludes that such a line “does not exist at all.”

Citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (sexual harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex), Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (sex stereotyping is discrimination on the basis of sex), and Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. (same sex harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex), the court held that sex discrimination has been understood to “cover far more than the simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A or a man for Job B.”

The majority addressed Hively’s two legal theories – (1) the comparative method, whether a woman and a man would be treated differently under the same facts, and (2) the associational theory, whether discrimination occurs against an individual because of the protected characteristic of one with whom the individual associates. Under each theory, the court reduced each inquiry to a simple question – if the employee in question were male instead of female, would it matter that the employee was in a relationship with a woman? Answering that if the sex of a plaintiff such as Hively in a lesbian relationship was changed, then the outcome would be different, the Court held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily is discrimination on the basis of sex.

The court acknowledged the long-standing critique of the judiciary with respect to civil rights issues – that the court was attempting to “legislate from the bench.” Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Diane P. Wood wrote that the decision to “amend” Title VII to add sexual orientation as a new protected category “lies beyond our power.” She further wrote: “We must decide instead what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex, and in particular, whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex. This is a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus well within the judiciary’s competence.” In response to the dissent’s reliance upon legislative intent, the Court noted that the definition of sex discrimination has expanded in numerous ways since the passage of Title VII, and that the Congress that enacted Title VII likely would be surprised as to the extent of expansion.

In an expectedly colorful concurrence, Judge Posner acknowledged that the Court is, in fact, re-writing Title VII because society’s definition of “sex” has changed over the past 50 years. Instead of relying solely upon stereotyping claims, as the majority writes, Judge Posner instead recognized that the judiciary has long been interpreting statutory language in the context of society’s new and changing understanding of terms. And here, Posner writes, that we should not rely upon the 88th Congress’ “failure” to divine how society’s interpretation of the term would change. Rather, he writes: “We understand the words of Title VII differently not because we’re smarter than the statute’s framers and ratifiers but because we live in a different era, a different culture.”

With a Circuit split, the question of whether sexual orientation is a protected characteristic under Title VII is ripe for review by the Supreme Court, although this case likely will not be the vehicle. Ivy Tech has released a statement that it does not intend to appeal. The decision in this case, however, may affect the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to rehear the Evans case en banc. When this issue does reach the Supreme Court, the soon-to-be-confirmed Supreme Court justice Neil Gorsuch could render an impactful vote should this reach the highest court.